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Almost immediately after the ¯nancial crisis broke the monetary
authorities in many countries reacted by announcing plans to increase
the capitalisation of banks. But they also wanted banks to increase
their lending following the freezing of interbank markets. These policies
are surely in con°ict. Together they have consequences for monetary
growth. This paper looks at some historical experience that suggest a
di®erent path.
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Introduction
The recent ¯nancial crisis of 2007/08 and beyond was a major shock
to the monetary authorities and the ¯nancial markets alike. Before
that, at least in most of the OECD, ¯nancial stability had been around
for so long that it had been taken for granted. In the United Kingdom
apart from the relatively minor disturbance in the secondary banking
sector in the 1970s, and another small-banks problem at the beginning
of the 1990s, the banking system had been widely regarded as utterly
secure for generations. There had been no threat to the payments
system in living memory. But the events of 2007/8 shattered the
complacency. Wide-ranging investigations followed and many proposals
for reform were introduced.
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The argument of this paper is that while the main diagnoses of
the problems were correct some of the main remedies being advanced
are in con°ict. The ¯rst part of the diagnosis was that the banks
had failed by being over-leveraged. They must therefore be far-better
capitalised in the future. The second part of the problem was that the
interbank market had frozen in the crisis (was the crisis) and banks
have been nervous of lending since. But they are being pressed to
lend. The problem has been that advocacy of better-capitalised banks
is in con°ict with advocacy of greater lending. They cannot both be
done at the same time. While all might readily agree with that, in the
on-going discussion there must either be some misunderstanding over
terms or the nature of the proposals.
This article focuses primarily on British historical experience. It will
argue that British bankers found their own way to appropriate capital
and liquidity ratios consistent with pro¯table lending. Regulation upset
the balance and distorted the process. It would be preferable to return
to a situation where bankers decide for themselves how much capital
to hold and what lending to do. But at the same time it must be
clear there will be no bail-outs. Banks must be able to fail. It is to
designing satisfactory resolution regimes that ensure that can happen
that the authorities' e®orts should be (and is being) directed.
Reform of banking
Following ¯nancial crises there are usually calls for reform, and
this time has been no di®erent. After a few years of considering the
questions the British Parliamentary Commission on Banking standards
published its report in July 2013. The report runs to 570 pages and
ranges over all kinds of behaviour and governance. It has commonly
been the case that following a ¯nancial crisis the knee-jerk reaction
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has been to impose new regulations. Something has clearly gone wrong
and so it must be stopped, prevented from happening again, and
barriers put in place to ensure that this is done. There seems to
be little thought given to the fact that it might be regulation that
has been the cause of the crisis. Almost as soon as the crisis broke
in September 2008 there was an announcement by the government
of a plan to recapitalise the British banking system. The Bank of
England called for a major recapitalisation of the UK banking system
of at least $50 billion, deemed a necessary condition for regenerating
con¯dence in the ¯nancial system.
It was not always the case that regulation was the automatic
response. For example, in Britain in the nineteenth century it tended
to be the opposite. There were many ¯nancial crises in England in the
¯rst two thirds of the century. In 1825 there came what many called
the ¯rst great crisis of ¯nancial capitalism. There followed several
others: in 1836-39; in 1847; in 1857; and in 1866 yet another, the
worst since that of 1825.
After each of these the response was to deregulate. The climate of
the times - the age of laissez-faire, the consequence of the revulsion
against the `old corruption' - was that there must be impediments that
were preventing the system working properly and these needed to be
addressed. After 1825 the rules preventing the establishment of joint
stock banks were partly removed. A little later they were removed
altogether. And at the same time the Usury laws were relaxed thus
allowing the Bank of England to begin to perform its proper function
of lender of last resort. In the 1840s the gold standard was better
de¯ned and after the 1847 crisis it became clear that holding to the
standard would not be insisted on in a crisis. In the 1850s limited
liability was permitted. There were no regulations on the amount of
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capital a bank was required to hold. There followed a long period of a
lightly regulated banking sector in which the banks found their own
way to the kinds of capital/asset, liquid/asset, and cash/asset ratios
they wished to hold, and as a matter of interest it was a long period
of remarkable stability.
But following the recent crisis it has been widely concluded that
banks in many western countries have been badly undercapitalised and
need to be recapitalised quickly. A great deal of focus has been placed
on the capital position.
So for example, in Britain the newly founded Financial Policy
Committee (FPC) has recommended that British banks should have
su±cient capital to cope with future risks. Some banks they say will
therefore need to raise their capital asset ratios. But the head of the
regulatory authority (PRA) of which the FPC is a sub-set, believes
that concerns that this will harm lending are misguided. `Capital
supports lending and does not substitute for it.' He says capital, `is not
money that has to be stashed away for a rainy day'. (Andrew Bailey,
Sunday Times, 5 May 2013, pB9) But that is surely precisely what it
is. It is held precisely for the purpose of covering unanticipated losses.
The FPC concluded in March of 2013 that banks should have an
equity capital ratio of at least 7% of risk-weighted assets by the
end of 2013. Basel III argues similarly if for a lesser amount. The
Financial Times journalist, Martin Wolf says, `Policymakers need to
ensure that banks are robustly capitalised. If they do not do so, it is
highly unlikely that banks will expand their lending'. (Financial Times,
7 June 2013) Even the highly acclaimed recent book on banking
makes puzzling statements: `For society, there are in fact signi¯cant
bene¯ts and essentially no cost from much higher equity requirements.'
And further, `Banks whose shares are traded on a stock exchange can
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raise money by issuing additional shares and selling them to investors.
If the additional funds are used to make loans, the higher capital
requirements will actually allow the banks to lend more rather than
less.' (Admati and Hellwig, pp. 98,99.)
There is it seems, at the very least, a need for a clari¯cation of
terms. In particular there is often an ambiguity over `reserves' and
on which side of the balance sheet they appear. For British banking
a highly simpli¯ed balance sheet looks like that shown in Figure
1. Liabilities comprise equity capital and deposits (or funding, both
retail and wholesale). And assets are made up of cash, short-term
investments, and the balance is loans. It has been common for a long
time to talk of a `reserve/asset ratio' or alternatively a `cash/asset
ratio' and thus to think of reserves as being an asset. That is entirely
legitimate if clearly understood. But a long tradition in British banking
allowed banks to hold hidden reserves. These were in e®ect pro¯ts that
had not been transferred to the balance sheet or had been disguised in
the balance. But pro¯ts, of course, belong to the shareholders and
just like equity capital they belong on the liability side of the balance
sheet. Thus when banks are urged to increase their reserves there
could be confusion over whether they are being asked to improve their
liquidity position or their capital position.
Figure 1 Traditional retail bank balance sheet
Liabilities Assets
Capital  10 Cash  10
Deposits  90 Liquidassets  30
Loans  60
Total 100 Total 100
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Capital in British banking
Capital has always been important to British banks. Indeed it was
considered so important that the government and the Bank of England
accepted the public interest argument that allowed the concealment of
true pro¯ts and capital until as quite late in the twentieth century.
Banks face a tension between having too much capital and too little.
Strong capital positions are designed to give depositors con¯dence. But
the greater the capital the lower will be the return on capital and
so there is a trade-o® between depositor con¯dence and shareholder
satisfaction. And of course the quality of the assets is key to any
calculation.
In the ¯rst half of the nineteenth century there were several hundred
banks in England. Before 1826 these were all unlimited liability
partnerships of no more than six. After 1826 joint-stock banking was
permitted and banks gradually adopted that form.
In the periodic ¯nancial crises that appeared many banks failed or
suspended payment for a time or merged or were taken over. There
were no regulations as to what proportion of the balance sheet their
capital or any other liability or asset might be. And across the middle
two quarters of the century what regulations that were in place were
gradually removed - such as the usury laws and unlimited liability.
The banks therefore had to ¯nd their own way to the appropriate
balance sheet shape and also allowed to choose whatever form of
governance they wanted. Following the repeated ¯nancial crises in 1825,
1836, 1847, 1857, and 1866 the banks began cautiously with very
high capital/asset ratios and similarly high liquid assets ratios. But
these gradually came down as trust and understanding developed. And
additionally, when after the 1870s it also became clear that the Bank
of England had assumed the role of lender of last resort there was
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an added reason for well-behaved banks to let their capital/asset and
other ratios fall slightly further.
The maintenance of `inner' or `hidden' reserves allowed banks to
smooth their reported pro¯ts, reassuring depositors and shareholders
by presenting a picture of ¯nancial soundness and prudent behaviour
thereby contributing to ¯nancial stability. The practice of maintaining
hidden reserves had been prevalent from the mid-nineteenth century -
the Midland Bank had, for example, ¯rst established a hidden reserve
in 1866. By the beginning of the last quarter of the century the
published capital ratios had settled at around 15 per cent with little
variation across banks, and by the end of the century that ¯gure had
slipped to around 10-12 per cent. (Discount Houses operated with
much lower levels for good reasons.)
In the in°ationary conditions of the First World War the ratios fell
further. In the years between the two world wars there continued to be
remarkable stability in the banking sector and the ratios slipped slightly
further. In the 1920s and 1930s they had settled at around 7 per cent.
The point needs stressing that English/British banks were remarkably
strong through these years and no doubt contributed to the stability
in the economy and the avoidance of a great depression. In the Second
World War the banks' capital ratios fell sharply. They were around 3
per cent. Their balance sheets expanded with government debt while
private lending fell away. But as the ratios fell so too did the risk since
the bulk of the balance sheet was made up of gilts. This continued to
be the case in the long period of adjustment following the war. In fact
the ratios reached their all-time lows in the 1950s when they were
down to between 2 and 3 per cent. Raising capital after the war was
not easy with the restrictions placed by the Capital Issues Committee.
This particular restriction on the banks began to tell and bank
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chairmen spent a lot of time in the 1950s lobbying the Bank of
England for support in allowing them to raise new capital. A note
for the Chief Cashier made the problem clear, `¢ ¢ ¢ it will be seen
that the capital structure of the Clearing Banks is far from sound
¢ ¢ ¢ At present it is clear that in times of trouble they must either
put footnotes in their balance sheets - which we deplore - or lean
on us for ¯nancial aid which would be disastrous ¢ ¢ ¢ The banks, [if]
freed from restriction, should pursue energetically the implementation
of a programme which, for good reasons, is long overdue. (Quoted in
Billings and Capie 2007 p.145.)
But as normality was restored and private lending came back to the
position it had formerly occupied and gilt holdings were correspondingly
reduced the capital/asset ratios slowly came back to around 4 or 5
per cent in the 1960s. There were still no regulations of any kind on
capital in place.
All these ¯gures are what were presented to the public in the banks'
balance sheets. It was well understood that the banks had further
reserves. And these hidden reserves did more than alluded to above in
allowing a smooth picture of business to be presented. They meant
that the banks were in fact a good deal stronger than was presented.
When the true positions are calculated all of the ¯gures given above
can be raised by at least one percentage point so that the lowest point
of the 1950s would be closer to 4 per cent. When risk weightings of
the Basel type are applied the ¯gures would be dramatically higher
re°ecting the quality of the assets the banks held across most of this
period. Thus the ¯gures for the 1920s would show ratios of around 14
per cent. Those of the Second World War would turn out to be the
highest of all time being even higher than 14 per cent. And in the
1960s the ratios were of the order of 13 per cent.
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But as the Lloyds' Bank chairman commented in the 1950s: `there
is no rule of thumb method of deciding the size of the capital funds
which a bank needs in order to carry on its business. The guiding
principles are that the resources as a whole must be su±cient to
provide absolute security for our depositors and the reserves su±cient
to meet °uctuation in our trading from year to year ¢ ¢ ¢ provision must
¢ ¢ ¢ be made against the di±culties associated with the °uctuations in
the market price of gilt-edged securities.' (Lloyds Chairman Report)
Only one o±cial report of the period considered capital explicitly and
that was the Prices and Incomes report of 1967. It concluded, `There
do not appear to be any concerted views among the banks about the
appropriate level at which these [reserves] should be maintained. The
banks do however, tend to consider their reserve requirements ¢ ¢ ¢ in
relation to total deposit obligations.' They believed that they had
restored their desired capital position at the time of the report.
However, as in°ation then took hold the banks were looking to raise
their capital base further. But that unfortunately coincided with the
biggest stock market fall of all time to date in Britain from 1972 to
1974 - the FT index fell from 533 in May 1972 to 160 in January
1974. Bank shares fared worse than most and some fell by as much as
70 per cent. It then became extremely di±cult to raise new capital.
There was no particular threat to the main retail bank sector but
there was a crisis in the secondary banking sector in the mid-1970s
and that led to legislation (in 1979). The Banking Act passed that
year placed limits on individual exposures to ensure appropriate
diversi¯cation. Exposures exceeding 25 per cent of capital required
prior approval of the Bank of England. That marked the beginning of
interference in bank operations. And soon after that, in the 1980s, the
rules of Basel took over.
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The beginnings of statutory banking regulation in addition to normal
company law appeared at di®erent times in di®erent countries. But the
¯rst hints of co-ordinated international regulation came in the wake
of two 1974 bank failures - those of Bankhaus Herstatt in Germany
and of Franklin National Bank in the United States. In large part
due to the way in which regulatory authorities handled these failures,
these relatively modestly sized banks caused considerable problems for
other banks when they failed. This led to the formation of a standing
committee of bank supervisors from the G10 countries; it has a
permanent secretariat at the Bank for International Settlements in
Basel - hence it is also known as the Basel Committee.
The Basel Accord of 1988 (Basel I) established a set of \Capital
Adequacy Standards" for banks operating internationally. This accord
required banks to hold capital according to Basel risk asset rules. It
was recognised that risk assets were not homogeneous, but despite that
recognition attention was paid only to credit risk - risk of default. Each
asset held by a bank was assigned to one of ¯ve risk classes. Each of
these classes had a di®erent degree of risk weighting; the higher the
risk, the higher the weighting, and the higher the capital required.
The weighting was based on the generic nature of the borrower and
no attention was paid to individual risks. So, for example, Marks and
Spencer would receive the same weighting as a newly started bookshop;
and the government of Argentina would get the same risk weighting
(zero) as that of the UK. Furthermore, the e®ect of the focus on
credit risk alone meant that no funds had to be set aside to cover, for
example, the e®ects of interest-rate variations on the market value of
long-term debt.
Anomalies, such as these and the fact that a lower risk weighting
was given to an o®-balance-sheet transaction with a business than to
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a straightforward loan to the same business, encouraged regulatory
arbitrage - the use of some ¯nancial instruments to allow a reduction
in capital without a corresponding reduction in risk. All that, of
course, points to weaknesses in Basel I, and these and other problems
led to reconsiderations that resulted in Basel II. Banks had no such
incentives to get round the rules when, as described earlier, they
themselves chose their appropriate capital ratios.
Even if businesses set their own capital levels and set them prudently,
they would at the moment still have to have the amount of capital
prescribed by the Basel rules. This `regulatory capital' may be less than
the bank's desired capital (sometimes called its `economic capital') for
some types of loan, for example, some government bonds, and too much
for others, for example, mortgages with very low loan-to-value ratios.
There was a tendency, therefore, for banks to decide on the prudent
amount of capital they needed to hold given their balance sheet, and
adjust the form of their lending, the assets they held, or the extent of
o®-balance-sheet transactions to ensure that they had the right amount
of economic capital but still exceeded the required regulatory capital.
This encouraged complexity and much of the creation of the ¯nancial
instruments that were implicated in the ¯nancial crisis.
An amendment to Basel I, announced in 1996 and adopted by 1998,
tackled one de¯ciency: market risk - the risk of loss through changes
in the market price of assets - was addressed. Banks were, subject to
the approval of their regulator, allowed to use their own models to
calculate market risk. These models were Value at Risk models, and
produced an estimate of the sensitivity of the value of a portfolio to
market price movements to show how much a ¯rm would lose for any
movement in prices. They would show banks the probability that they
could lose a given amount of capital.
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In the absence of an approved internal model banks had to use the
Basel \standardised approach". That was a \building blocks" approach.
Four market risks were identi¯ed - interest rate, exchange rate, equity
prices, and commodity prices - ; a capital charge was determined for
each of these; and then these charges were added up. Note that because
no relationship between the risks was allowed for, risk diversi¯cation, a
classic principle of prudent banking was ignored and not rewarded in
terms of the amount of regulatory capital that was required to be
held. The de¯ciencies of the ¯rst Accord were removed in the second.
In 2001 a proposal was made for reform of capital regulation. This
proposal was subject to considerable adverse comment, and eventually
a `three pillar' approach was introduced. There were measures of
credit risk, which allowed for previously neglected `subtleties' such as
recognising that some companies can be less risky than some countries,
and the recognition of operational risk (risk arising from failure of a
part of the bank's operations - computer failure stopping people getting
their money is a good example). In addition to this more complex `risk
pillar', there were a supervisory pillar and a market discipline pillar.
These three pillars were supposed to support the structure of banking.
The risk pillar has already been described. The supervisory pillar
speci¯ed the responsibilities of national supervisors. These, in summary,
were to ensure that banks measured their risks properly; that they
encouraged review and updating of the way risks were measured; that
they should encourage banks to hold above-minimum capital; and that
they should encourage banks to restore capital to desired levels as soon
as possible should banks experience losses. What is surprising about
that list is not only that it all seems extremely obvious, but that it
comprises functions that look like primary duties of bank management.
The market discipline pillar encourages banks to disclose information
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on risk exposure, capital adequacy and methods of calculating capital
requirements quarterly or semi-annually. This is all information which,
if concealed or incorrect, could mislead markets.
But the fact is that the three pillars did not support the structure
of banking. There was a major banking crisis over a substantial part
of the world. All the major studies on the subject (a thorough
survey is provided in Lastra and Wood, 2009, and a study of an
individual episode can be found in \The Run on the Rock", the
report by the Treasury Select Committee of the House of Commons
on the failure of Northern Rock) identi¯es the same principle
features: perverse incentives, complacent management and shareholders,
inadequate evaluation of risk, and regulatory failure so gross as in
some cases deservedly to be described as incompetence. What was
the response to these failures? In the U.K. there was the Vickers
Commission and in the U.S. the proposals of a team led by Paul
Volcker are examples. These proposals had much in common, despite
the fact that they are often being contrasted.
It is not surprising that they had much in common because they
both were confronted with a similar two-part question: a) how could
banks be prevented from failing, and b) how they could be closed in
an orderly fashion? The two parts of the question led to the same
answer - separate investment banking (dealing in markets, essentially)
from the traditional banking activities of borrowing and lending. They
led to this answer by di®erent routes. There was an idea that
investment banking, described by the naÄ³ve as casino banking, was
more risky than normal banking. This was quite the opposite of what
had been the case in the UK, where the notable failures were of
normal commercial banks (RBS and HBOS) which threatened the
stability of their investment banking operations.
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The Volcker Rule in its purest form prohibits deposit-taking banks
from engaging in proprietary trading and investment in private equity
or hedge funds. The Dodd Frank Act (which embodied the Volcker
rule) enacted a slightly modi¯ed form of the rule which permitted
limited investment in private equity or hedge funds (up to 3 per cent
of Tier 1 Capital) and allowed trading for purposes of hedging, market
making and liquidity management.
The main di®erence between the Volcker rule and the proposal of
the Vickers commission relates to the location and height of the fence
that divides the di®erent banking activities. The Volcker rule seeks to
ban completely what is seen as the most risky sort of trading activity
from being carried out in a deposit-taking bank, but allows most
investment banking activity to remain. The Vickers ring-fence seeks to
insulate the core activities of the deposit-taking bank from a wider
range of risky or non-essential activities, but via a split rather than a
ban. It saw the advantage of a ring-fence over the Volcker rule is that
banning proprietary trading would have only a modest impact in the
UK where this is a relatively limited activity. In contrast, ring-fencing
should facilitate resolution of both the ring-fenced and non-ring-fenced
entities.
Basel III rules will raise banks' capital requirements from 4 per cent
to 7 per cent. In June 2011 the Basel committee agreed to impose a
surcharge of 2.5 per cent on top of this for banks that were judged
to be too big to fail. And many urge even higher ratios. The Swiss
National Bank proposed a 19 per cent ratio for Switzerland's two
largest banks, UBS and Credit Suisse. The Swiss Parliament approved
that rise in June 2011. (Hanke)
Thus what the above has shown is that in spite of much talk about
there having been ¯nancial deregulation and that that has played a
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major role in the crisis, that is not the case. Regulation has steadily
changed since the 1980s and has been ratcheted up at various points.
And it has frequently moved from one state of regulation to an inferior
one.
Monetary growth
How then have the recent regulatory changes a®ected monetary
growth, and by implication economic growth? Too much money is a
bad thing. It leads to in°ation. Too little money is a bad thing. It
leads to de°ation. An unexpected sharp monetary contraction is also
a bad thing. In the face of sticky wages and prices in the short
run it has damaging e®ects on the real economy. The importance of
the optimum quantity of money has become accepted and that has
generally come to mean keeping the trend rate of monetary growth on
a path that is consistent with the rate of growth in the real economy.
If that can be achieved there should be stable money and prices -
in general. When that is understood economic agents can see more
clearly what the changes in relative prices are.
For these reasons ¯nancial instability is to be feared. A ¯nancial crisis
(a clear manifestation of ¯nancial instability) is generally characterised
as a °ight to cash. In normal times the non-bank public hold a
steady amount of cash in relation to bank deposits. And banks hold
a steady amount of cash reserves in relation to their total deposits.
These two elements constitute the basis of the money multiplier. The
monetary authorities provide high-powered money and the multiplier
on this delivers broad money. When, for whatever reason, there is a
shock to the system and individuals decide to hold cash rather than
deposits, banks try to build cash reserves to satisfy the demand from
customers. But the result of these two actions is a shrinkage in the
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money multiplier that has disastrous consequences for money growth
and hence the real economy.
In these circumstances the monetary authorities need to inject
su±cient high-powered money to o®set the decline in broad money.
The composition of the broad money aggregate does not matter. What
matters is keeping M3 on an even keel.
This was a lesson learned over a long period through several ¯nancial
crises in the nineteenth century. It is the essence of the role of the
lender of last resort. The monetary authorities can print money without
limit, or otherwise create it. When the ¯nancial markets understand
this there will be less likelihood of ¯nancial panics occurring. It should
also be stressed that it must still be possible for poorly behaved banks
to fail. The central banks can provide liquidity but not capital.
The biggest demonstration of failure of a central bank to do what
was required of it can be found in the behaviour of the Federal Reserve
in the years 1929-33. That failure resulted in the great depression, the
greatest economic disaster to hit the United States. The Fed, although
a young institution at that stage nevertheless did know how to use
open market operations and had done so successfully at the beginning
of the 1920s. But at various points in the course of 1929-33 it failed to
do what was required. The result was that money growth stalled and
then fell sharply and produced the catastrophic collapse in output.
The lesson was to keep money growth on its trend path.
That lesson was learned and the Fed demonstrated on more than
one occasion that it had learned the lesson. Perhaps it over-learned
the lesson and at any sign of trouble it eased monetary conditions.
Certainly after 2004 U.S. monetary growth was surging at rates that
reached 15 per cent per annum until the crash of 2008. It then
collapsed precipitately and kept falling for more than two years by
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which time it was in negative territory. It was not growing again until
2011. This was in spite of the programme of quantitative easing.
The U.S. inevitably su®ered a deep recession. That was also true of
the euro area where a similar pattern of broad money growth could be
found and with the same consequences. Most dramatically this was the
case in Greece. The U.K. too had a similar path to the U.S. Countries
that did relatively well were countries where the money stock held up,
countries as diverse as Switzerland and China.
Con°ict
The institutions that eventually became central banks frequently
began their lives as government banks. They were formed primarily
to carry out government business. But they gradually began to do
commercial lending. When other commercial banks appeared they
competed alongside them. In their evolution towards central bank it
was necessary for the formerly government banks to withdraw from
commercial rivalry since there could arise a clear con°ict of interest.
For example, for macro-economic reasons it might be desirable to raise
interest rates while for commercial reasons it might be desirable to
lower rates. That kind of con°ict could become worse if the new
central banks assumed some sort of supervision of the other banks. It
would be intolerable for a central bank to be in competition with a
bank whose activities it was in some ways directing.
Even although central banks have withdrawn from commercial rivalry
is there still a possible con°ict between macro-economic policy (or
monetary policy) and microeconomic policy (or macro-prudential policy
as that is sometimes puzzlingly called)? The Deputy governor of the
Bank of England Charlie Bean argues `No': ` Tightening monetary
policy reduces both aggregate demand and credit supply, while tighter
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regulatory policy does the same.' (Bean 2011) But what if one needs
to be tight and the other loose? What if the monetary policy called
for is a loosening - an easing of credit conditions, while regulatory
policy is deemed to need tightening, say that banks need to better
capitalised. Then there is surely a con°ict.
That particular scenario seems to capture quite accurately present
circumstances in the United Kingdom and further a¯eld in the years
following the global Financial Crisis. Monetary policy has been loose:
low interest rates and quantitative easing. (And that is now said to be
going to continue for a long period ahead in the new policy of forward
guidance.) But at the same time the banks have been accused of being
over-leveraged, that is insu±ciently well capitalised, and that has to
be corrected. So regulatory policy and monetary policy are in con°ict.
And yet it is clear that the o±cial view does not accept that. Robert
Jenkins, who was a member of the Bank of England's Financial Policy
Committee made the point strongly in a speech in September 2012:
`Bank A has a trillion euro balance sheet supported by 50 billion of
equity. Now, let's double the equity required to 100 billion and retire
50 billion of bank debt. Has the balance sheet shrunk? No. Has the
bank had to cut credit? No. Does more capital necessarily lead to
less lending? No. So does society have to choose between safety and
growth? No. ¢ ¢ ¢ But if you fall for this fallacy you will agonise between
doing what is right for the economy short term and what is right for
stability and your country long term. Bankers have exploited this fear.'
Notice the sleight of hand. The bank actually had a 100 billion of
capital to start with - 50 billion of equity capital and 50 billion of
debt capital. So when it was required to raise its equity capital it
swapped debt for equity. Of course it follows that its balance sheet
will not need to change in any other respect. But that is not what is
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being demanded from either domestic or international regulators.
The opposite and correct case has been strongly put by Tim
Congdon. `The regulatory blight on banking systems in all the world's
so-called advanced economies, which means for these purposes all
nations that belong to the Bank for International Settlements (BIS).
The growth of commercial banks' risk assets is constrained by o±cial
demands for more capital relative to assets, for more liquid and
low-risk assets in asset totals, and for less reliance on supposedly
unstable funding (i.e. wholesale/inter-bank funding). If nothing else
were happening, the contraction of asset totals and the rise in the
proportion of capital to total liabilities would result in falls in the
quantity of money, broadly de¯ned, which would in turn imply falls in
the equilibrium levels of national income and wealth. In some of the
Eurozone's Club Med countries, and even to some degree in France
and Italy, these processes of money contraction are still very much at
work.' (Congdon a, June 2013, p.1)
Indeed Congdon goes much further. He argues that the collapse in
bank lending that took place in 2008 (in all leading economies) was a
direct consequence of the rushed response to the crisis that saw capital
requirements raised immediately. It was that that was responsible for
the 2009 policy of quantitative easing. While that has not entirely
o®set the drop in bank lending it went a long way. Had there been no
quantitative easing the broad money aggregate would have been of the
order of 25 per cent lower than it is today.
But, of course, it continues to be stressed by the authorities that
ever- higher capital requirements, as outlined above, are being called
for in the next few years. But with the economy beginning to grow
slowly there is also the suggestion that quantitative easing has come to
an end and indeed that it will have to be gradually withdrawn. What
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then happens to money growth and the growth of nominal income?
In summary, `The regulatory blight in banking systems has therefore
been the dominant cause of the sluggish growth rates of nominal
gross domestic products, across the advanced-country world, that have
characterised the Great Recession and the immediately subsequent
years. Indeed, the ¯ve years to the end of 2012 saw the lowest increases
- and in the Japanese and Italian cases actual decreases - in nominal
GDP in the G-7 leading industrialised countries for any half decade
since the 1930s'. (Congdon, 2013b, p.1))
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